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BIONORMATIVITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PARENTHOOD
Katharine K. Baker•
Despite the political intrigue generated by the gay marriage debate, there is a growing
consensus that family law as a discipline is shifting from a set of rules designed primarily
to regulate sexual relationships between adults to a set of rules designed to regulate
parental relationships between adults and children.1 The law has not abandoned its
regulation of horizontal relationships between adults. It is just that the need for extensive
regulation has diminished. Increased reliance on private ordering,2 decreased demand for
marriage as an institution to take care of women’s economic dependency3 and relaxed
norms with regard to sexual activity have simply made marriage less primary than it used
to be. In contrast, the need for extensive regulation of parenthood has increased.
There is much talk about how the diminished importance of marriage harms children by
destabilizing homes and breeding competing loyalties,4 but the diminished importance of
marriage affects children in a more fundamental way. Without the law of marriage, we
do not know who parents are. For the most part, the law of marriage has always
determined the law of parenthood. More particularly, the marital status of one’s mother
determined who one’s legal father was, and, indeed, if one had a legal father. This marital
presumption of parenthood was, for a very long time, essentially irrebuttable. In
•
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1
See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW xiii (2000)
(“the code of family responsibility is being rewritten in terms of the only ties left – the ones to children”);
JOHN EEKELAAR, REGULATING DIVORCE (1991) (“Indissoluble marriage has been replaced by the
indissoluble responsibility of parenthood.”); Martha Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
239, 245-246 (2001) (“The pressing problems today do not revolve around the marriage connection, but the
caretaker-dependent relationship”). A recent annual review from the Family Law Quarterly put it this way:
“Parentage and Assisted Reproduction Take Center Stage”. See Linda Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A
Review of the Year in Family Law: Parentage and Assisted Reproduction Take Center Stage, 39 FAM. L.Q.
879 (2006)
2
See Brian Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 313
(discussing deference to separation agreements); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119
HARV. L. REV. 491, 505 (2005) (“husbands and wives have wide-ranging authority to contract about how to
distribute their property during marriage and at divorce.”)
3
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony statute providing support only to women struck down
because it was based on the inappropriate presumption that women are economically dependent on their
spouses and men are not).
4
See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 1 (1990-91) (tying various social ills to the absence of two parent families); Andrew Cherlin,
Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Christine McRae, Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health through the
Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239-49 (1998) (finding more emotional disturbance in children of divorce).
For a general review of the literature see Paul Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’
Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 143-164 (Spring 1994)
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England, spouses were forbidden from testifying against the presumption.5 The strictness
of that procedural rule dissipated over time, but the substantive problem of proving
paternity did not. Until very recently, the marital presumption made it exceedingly
difficult to establish paternity in anyone other than the husband, so marriage remained the
primary arbiter of parenthood. In the last 20 years, two factors have combined to
severely compromise the importance of the marital presumption. First, reliable genetic
testing makes it very easy to overcome the marital presumption of paternity. Second, the
growing number of children born to unwed mothers renders the marital presumption
irrelevant for a significant portion of our population.6
Many people may presume that these two factors have allowed “biological truth,” i.e.
genetic connection, to replace marriage as the primary legal arbiter of parenthood.
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that biological truth is actually what the marital
regime aimed for all along. It was “designed to ensure that children would be raised by
their genetic parents,”7 but because there was no way of determining biological
connection, the system used marriage as a proxy. Still, the willingness of the legal
system to actually impose parental status based on anything other than marriage is
relatively recent8 and the ability of a legal regime to enforce systematically a regime of
biological parenthood is extremely recent.9 It has only been in the last 20 years that
genetic testing procedures have been reliable enough to determine biological parentage.10
Perhaps we should consider ourselves lucky that the remarkable explosion in genetic
science arrived just in time to fill the void left by the decreased significance of marriage.
Without marriage, we are in desperate need of a system to determine parenthood.
Biology, which for years has played a kind of background role, can now play the
exclusive role. But do we want it to?
Given where we are, at the demise of the marital regime and the potential rise of the
biological one, it seems appropriate to ask some fundamental questions about why the
5

Neither husband nor wife could testify to non-access, unless the husband was “beyond the four seas” of
England. Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 291, 98 Eng. Rep, 1257 (1977).
6
The Center for Disease Control reports that 35.8% of all births were to unmarried women in 2004. CDC,
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 55 no. 1, Sept. 29, 2006. The rate of birth unmarried women has
risen particularly fast for older women. The Atlantic Monthly reports that the number of children born to
unmarried women over age 30 rose by 290 percent from 1980 to 2002. (Lori Gottlieb, The XY Files, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 142, Sept. 2005.
7
June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of
Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1024 (2003).
8
The first legal paternity proceedings were introduced in England in 1565. See infra 24-25.
9
One cannot base legal status on a condition that is impossible to determine with any real accuracy. Until
the advent of DNA testing, it was simply impossible to really know who the genetic father was. See David
L . Faigman et al. Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 19-1.4
(1997) (reliable genetic testing now allows us to determine paternity in a way that HLA and blood group
testing never could).
10
For purposes of this article, the terms genetic parenthood and biological parenthood have the same
technical meaning, to wit, a parent-child relationship based on the fact that the parent’s genetic material is
present in the child. I have chosen not to simply replace the term “biological” with “genetic” because the
two terms retain different social meanings. The term “biological” tends to connote an organic, natural
process of family formation, whereas the term “genetic” tends to connote the opposite.
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law should care about biological parenthood. This essay attempts to do that by exploring
the benefits and byproducts of a parental regime based on biology. It suggests that what
makes a biological, or what I will label “bionormative,” regime attractive to many is not
so much the importance of the genetic connection between parent and child, but is instead
the way in which a bionormative regime constructs parenthood as private (meaning that
the state has no legitimate interest in regulating, but also no requirement to finance,
parenthood), exclusive (meaning one’s parental status may not be usurped by anyone
else), and binary (meaning there are two and only two parents).11 These ancillary
qualities of bionormativity may have as much to do with our attraction to biology as does
biology itself. As technology allows us to both ascertain and tinker with genetic
connection, and as the traditional nuclear family gives way to a myriad of other family
structures, it is critically important that we think about not only the importance of
biological connection, but also the other aspects of bionormativity that make it appealing.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why, despite what appears to be common
consensus in favor of bionormativity,12 a bionormative regime is not historically,
biologically or morally compelled. Part II then starts to unpack the appeal of
bionormativity for three important constituencies, the state, parents and children. Part
IIA explores the state interest. Because a biologically based system appears to make
parenthood a pre or extra legal fact, a liberal state is attracted to bionormativity for
financial and administrative reasons.13 Part IIB analyzes parents’ interests in
bionormativity and suggests that parents’ interests parallels the state’s. While the state is
attracted to a regime that makes parental obligation a function of pre or extra legal fact,
parents are attracted to a regime that makes parental rights a function of pre or extra
legal fact. As a matter of biology, one either is a parent of “x” or one is not and that fact
is forever. In a bionormative world, biological parents do not have to worry about
significant state regulation of parenthood and they do not have to worry about someone
else usurping their exclusive status as parents. Both parents and the state are also
attracted to the binary qualities of bionormativity. Because biological parenthood is
always binary, parenthood is always conceptualized as binary and that conceptualization
allows both the state and parents to balance the need to provide for children with the
desire to limit the class of people entitled to parent any one child. Part IIC analyzes
11

There is overlap, though not identity, between the concepts of exclusive and binary parenthood. For
short hand purposes, one can think of a non-exclusive regime as one that incorporates more than two
parents, while a non-binary regime is a regime that allows only one. This is a little misleading though
because an exclusive regime could allow one (and only one) parent and a non-binary regime could allow
for more than two parents.
12
Martha Minnow writes there is “a remarkable degree of consensus . . . [that]. . [p]eople who produce
children should provide for their support.” MARTHA MINNOW, How Should We Think About Child Support
Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE 302 (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 2001).
13
A discussion of the various definitions and qualifications for the terms “liberalism” or “liberal state” is
well beyond the scope of this essay. For the purposes of this article, I use the term “liberal state” only to
suggest a state that perceives itself as ideally serving a limited role of “provid[ing] a framework of rules
and guidelines designed to enable society very largely to run itself. “ JOSE HARRIS, Society and the State in
Twentieth-Century Britain, in THE CAMBRIDGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN, 1750-1950, 67
(F.M.L.Thompson ed., 1990). See generally, JULIA O’CONNOR, ANN SHOLA ORLOFF & SHEILA SHAVER,
STATES, MARKETS, FAMILIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT
BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1999).

3

children’s interests in bionormativity. It suggests that children share some interests in the
private and exclusive qualities of bionormativity, though possibly not an interest in its
binary nature. More important, children, unlike the state and parents, may have a
compelling interest in the biological aspect of bionormativity, though the evidence in this
regard is not conclusive.
Part III proceeds to evaluate how the core attributes of bionormativity, privacy,
exclusiveness, binariness and biology are threatened by contemporary parenting
practices. The extent of child poverty, the rejection of (even the appearance of) life-time
monogamy and the use of donated gametes all work to destabilize a bionormative regime.
In short, there are many people who now have an interest in making parenthood less
private, less exclusive, less binary and/or less biological. The law is often receptive to
their claims. Part III concludes with some queries about which attributes of
bionormativity may be most vulnerable and what the consequences of jettisoning them
would be. Part IV, the conclusion, makes two points. First, it is clear that the most
disruptive force to the defining features of biological parenthood is not human
manipulation of the biological reproductive process, but adult living patterns that expose
children to many parent-like figures. Because contemporary adult relationships are less
likely to be permanently binary and exclusive, so is parenthood.14 When parenthood
becomes less binary and exclusive, it becomes less private and less biological as well.
The more the legal system feels compelled to recognize functional parent relationships,
the greater the erosion of all of the core features of bionormativity. Second, a regime in
which the legal system does recognize multiple parental relationships is likely to be a
regime in which we see not only more than two parents, but different degrees of
parenthood, greater and lesser parenthood. To the extent that the law already creates
greater and lesser forms of parenthood at divorce, it is controversial. The analysis here
suggests that recognizing degrees of parenthood may be an inevitable byproduct of a
system that rejects bionormativity.
This essay does not endorse or reject biological parenting or any of its core qualities. It
does suggest that it is important to separate out different aspects of bionormativity in
order to balance the competing priorities that inform a conceptualization of parenthood.
Given the decreased importance of marriage and the increased ability to perfect a
biological system, we have to come to terms with what we really care about. There is
much to be said in favor of a regime that is private, exclusive, binary and biological. If
we cannot or do not want to hold on to all of these qualities of parenthood, we may at
least want to hold on to some. Doing so will require an articulation of normative
commitments and priorities. These normative commitments will, in turn, define the
contours of parenthood in the coming century.
I.

The History, Nature and Morality of Bionormativity

A. History

14

The non-binary and non-exclusive nature of adult relationships has everything to do, of course, with the
decreased ubiquity of permanent marriage.
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As suggested, biology has not always played a primary role in determining parentage.
Under Roman Law, the parentage of children born to married women (or women in
recognized concubinage relationships) was a function of who the state recognized as their
mothers’ partner, but children born to unmarried mothers were filius nullius, or children
of no one.15 The illegitimate children of royalty or other rich men were often provided
for, but such care was up to the whim of the biological father.16 Women who could not
depend on this kind of largesse often abandoned their babies so that others could care for
them.17 As John Eekelar has noted, abandonment was an “informal method of
transferring responsibility for the care of children from parents to others in the
community.”18 Abandonment was commonplace for centuries, yet none of Ancient,
early Christian or later European society attempted to impose serious sanctions on the
practice.19
The idea of compelling a biological father to support his children originated in Europe in
1234, when Pope Clement III issued an edict declaring that fathers had a duty to support
their children, regardless of whether the children were born to a marriage.20 Ecclesiastic
courts, in local parishes, enforced this edict by entertaining suits to establish paternity and
imposing support obligations.21 The Church’s primary motivation for imposing the
obligation may have been financial. Responsibility for children who were not provided
for privately fell to individual parishes.22
By the 16th century, with increased urbanization, more clustered poverty and decreasing
canonical influence, secular governments throughout Europe began to assume more
responsibility for the poor.23 Children born to unmarried mothers were usually poor.
Accordingly, in 1576, as part of the Poor Laws, the British Parliament adopted the first
15

Richard Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of
the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 435 (1977) (Roman law required biological fathers to support
children born to the recognized form of Roman concubinage).
16
See, for instance, the story of how Charles II provided for his numerous illegitimate children, described
in JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 57-58 (1982).
17
John Boswell has documented how parents of all social standing abandoned children throughout Europe
from antiquity through the middle ages. He estimates that 20-40% of Roman children were abandoned.
JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS 428 (1988).
18
John Eekelaar, Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for Their Children? 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
340, 341 (1991).
19
Chistian writers sometimes assailed the irresponsible sexuality that led to the abandonment, but they did
not condemn the abandonment itself. See Boswell, supra note 17 at 429-430.
20
Id. at 434
21
The standards for proof appeared to be more lax in medieval England than they were in the modern
United States, Id. at 440, but the support amounts ordered also appear to have been quite modest. Also
interesting is the fact that, once established, the claims were reciprocal, children were responsible for the
aged parents just as parents were responsible for their dependent children. Id. at 435.
22
LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 520 (1977). The
legitimacy and efficacy of these courts may well have been aided by the small close-knit communities in
which they operated. The range of potential defendants was limited as was the ability of a defendant to
evade the ecclesiastical court’s judgment. Still, the number of claims brought for enforcement of existing
orders suggest that then, as now, it is difficult to get non-marital fathers to pay support on a consistent
basis. See Helmholz, supra note at 445.
23
See TEICHMAN, supra note 16 at 60.
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secular paternity suit.24 These first paternity actions were brought by Justices of the
Peace to seek reimbursement from the biological fathers of children who were receiving
support from the state.25 Both the Church and Parliament emphasized the immorality of
extra-marital sex when imposing a duty of support on unwed fathers and legislation
regarding paternal duties to support remained deeply imbued with moral judgments about
extra-marital sex until the late 17th and early 18th centuries.26 Indeed, many
commentators argued that the obligation to support was rooted in the illicit sexual
activity, not paternity itself.27 This line of argument augured in favor of holding multiple
men responsible for support if it could be established that all had intercourse with the
mother at a time that could have produced a child.28
By the 18th century, the increasing secularization of European societies tended to shift
legislative concern toward economic conditions of the child, not the immorality of its
conception.29 It was not until 1845 though, that unwed mothers (as opposed to the state)
in England acquired the right to sue a biological father for support.30 Only at this point
did the secular law of England fully accept the idea that biological paternity gave rise to
an obligation for reasons having nothing to do with state expenditures or immoral activity
or marriage.
The degree to which other countries made biological fathers responsible varied widely.
In France, in the 17th and 18th centuries, an unmarried man could be found responsible for
a child born to an unmarried woman, but a married man could not be sued in paternity.31
By the mid-nineteenth century, section 340 of the Napoleonic Code, which applied to
vast portions of Europe, eliminated all paternity actions and forbade any tracing of
paternity.32 The Dutch adopted this prohibition as well.33 The tradition among Germanic
tribes (who may not have adopted the Napoleonic Code) was to impose paternity only if
the biological mother and father were of equal class or race.34
In this country, until approximately 40 years ago, the nature and even existence of a
biological parent’s duty to support his children depended on wildly inconsistent state
24

Lawrence P. Hampton, Overview, in DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.02(1)-(3) (2004).
Id.
26
Stone, supra note 22.
27
J. E. Scholtens, Maintenance of Illegitimate Children and the Exceptio Plurium Concubentium, 72 S.
AFR. L. J. 144, 150-51 (1955).
28
Id. The idea of holding all men who slept with the mother responsible is practiced in modern day India
and in various tribes throughout South America. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
29
Stone, supra note at 634-35.
30
Hampton, supra note 24 at § 1.02(1) – (3). Prior to this, it was up to individual parishes whether to
distribute any of the proceeds of their collection to the mother for care of the child. See TEICHMAN, supra
note 16 at 64.
31
See Teichman, supra note 16 at 154. The children of the married putative fathers who could not be sued
for support were cared for in foundling homes run by religious orders. Id The bar prohibiting the
establishment of paternity in a married man also existed in modern, Islamic Turkey. BELMA BAYAR,
TURKEY: LAW ON LEGITIMACY 16 (1981).
32
See. Scholtens, supra note 27 at 148-149.
33
Id.
34
TEICHMAN, supra note 15 at 55.
25
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law.35 Some states imposed no obligation on unwed biological fathers;36 some states let
judges impose discretionary obligations on unwed fathers;37 other states mandated that
genetic fathers provide fixed monthly amounts of support for illegitimate children; 38
still other states made the unwed biological parent duty to support equivalent to that of a
divorced parent.39 For a long while states also expressed a variety of views regarding the
reason for the parental obligation: for some it was punishment for extramarital sex, for
some it was punishment for refusing to marry the mother and for some it was simply a
liability owed to the child.40
This haphazard and unequal treatment of biological parenthood might have continued in
this country were it not for the federalization of social welfare benefits. Because most
American 20th century social welfare programs, many of which were targeted to help
poor children, drew on federal funds, the federal government acquired a keen interest in
paternity law. Like the British Poor Laws of 1576, the United States Federal Child
Support Act of 1984 sought to recoup funds that the government was paying out to
support the children of unmarried fathers.41 It sought to do this by demanding more
comprehensive enforcement of biologically based paternity laws. The 1984 Child
Support Amendments required all states to allow children to sue their biological father
for paternity until the child’s eighteenth birthday and to promulgate child support
guidelines that imposed child support payments commensurate with a biological parent’s
income.42 Thus, the 20th century American legislation made the obligation to support a
child a function of a parent’s ability to pay and it imposed that obligation regardless of
the child’s extant economic situation. These rules remain in place today.
B. Nature and Evolutionary Biology
Perhaps aware that the non-ecclesiastical justifications for paternity laws have always
been somewhat opaque, Blackstone, as early as 1688, felt the need to clarify why
biological fathers should be financially responsible for their children. He wrote:

The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle
of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature itself, but by their
own proper act, in bringing them into the world . . . . By begetting them,
therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as fare as in

35

HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-25 (1971).
Idaho did not impose a support duty on the father of an illegitimate child until 1969, Id. Stat. Ann. § 71101 et seq.; It was not until 1973 that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’ law imposing a support
liability on parents of legitimate children but not on parents of illegitimate children, Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973).
37
KRAUSE, supra note 35 at 23.
38
See e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48-7-4 (1966).
39
KRAUSE, supra note 35 at 23.
40
For a discussion see State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (9 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967)
41
42 U.S.C. § 600 et seq. (2000).
42
Id.
36
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them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and
preserved.43
In this excerpt, Blackstone identifies two potential sources of parental obligation: nature
and causality. Neither explanation survives scrutiny.
What Blackstone put in terms of natural law, contemporaries might well put in terms of
evolutionary biology. It is natural for biological parents to support their children because
biological parents are the ones most likely to be willing to support their offspring.
Science tells us that the genes that survive are the genes best able to reproduce
themselves and the best way to ensure reproduction is to support the bodies that contain
the genes. That, in a much simplified form, is the core tenet of modern evolutionary
biology.44 Biological parents will support their children because by supporting them they
will ensure their own genes’ survival. Thus, nature seems to ensure responsible
biological parenthood.
This is a neat, parsimonious explanation, but if nature really ensured responsible
biological parenthood, neither Pope Clement in the 13th century, nor the British
Parliament in the 16th century, nor the U.S.Congress in the 20th century would have
worried about mandating biological parenthood. Quite obviously, we have mandatory
child support laws precisely because biological parents often do not support their
children. The familiar failure of some biological parents to support their children does
not render the evolutionary evidence irrelevant, however. Indeed, evolutionary biology
can help explain why some biological parents might not support their children. In doing
it so it also raises questions about the extent to which the law should impose an obligation
on biological parents who do not accept it voluntarily.
If the first tenet of evolutionary biology is that the genes that survive are the ones that
compel us to behave in ways that maximize the likelihood of survival, the second tenet of
evolutionary biology may well be that men and women are different. They are (on
average) different -- in their sexual behavior, in their mating requirements, in their
parenting patterns, in their aggression and along numerous other axes -- for one simple
reason: the female gamete is much bigger than the male gamete and this larger size
means that females contribute disproportionately to the reproductive process. 45 The
bigger female gamete size allows the female to contribute the food reserves that the
fertilized egg needs to grow, but it also keeps the female from producing the number of
(smaller) gametes that a male can produce. This means that a female has to care more
about any one gamete than does a male.
Moreover, because human beings are fertilized and gestated inside the female, mothers
are biologically compelled to contribute more to each fertilized egg. Indeed, after
43

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 435 (1765).
See generally, RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN, SEX,
AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993); RICHARD WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL (1994).
45
Richard Dawkins writes that “it is possible to interpret all the other differences between the sexes as
stemming from this one difference.” DAWKINS, supra note 45 at 141.
44
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fertilization and before birth, with the exception of possible male donations of food to the
mother, the mother is the only one who invests in the reproductive process, and her
investment is enormous.46 Evolutionary biology tells us that disproportionate female
investment, pre-birth, coupled with the fact that (until the last 20 years) a male could
never be absolutely sure that a child born to his sexual partner actually had his genetic
material, make women, on average, invest much more in born children than do men.47
This lopsided investment pattern works well for men because “[i]f one parent can get
away with investing less than his or her fair share of costly resources in each child . . . he
will be better off, since he will have more to spend on other children by other sexual
partners, and so propagate more of his genes.”48 A gene that routinely encouraged a
parent to abandon all of his young might not survive as well because none of his
offspring would get the benefit of his continued investment, but a reproductive strategy
that involved some support of some of his children, and meager support of others
(particularly if those others might be supported adequately by the mother or another
male) might be very successful. Indeed, Richard Dawkins predicted exactly that kind of
behavior.49 In short, a study of nature reveals that failing to support (at least some of)
one’s children is perfectly natural.50
The fact that biology suggests that many men will not voluntarily support their young
does not mean that the law should not try to compel them to do so. Evolutionary biology
suggests that many people are inclined to many pernicious behaviors (rape, marital
exploitation, child abuse), that the law need not condone.51 Neither, however, do the
insights from evolutionary biology suggest that the law should compel biological parents
to contribute to the welfare of their children if the parents do not want to. What nature, or
biology, tells us is that if we are to compel unwilling parents to support their children we
may well be compelling them to do something that is contrary to their reproductive
interests. The law can choose to do that, but it should only choose to do that if in so
doing it is fulfilling a normative agenda.52 Thus, while Blackstone may have thought

46

See Eileen McDonough, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion
Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057, 1073-74 (1999) (describing the severe physical burdens of pregnancy).
47
See generally ROBERT TRIVERS, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection in SEXUAL SELECTION AND
THE DESCENT OF MAN 136, 139 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972)
48
DAWKINS, supra note 44 at 140.
49
Dawkins made this prediction using game theory and arbitrary numbers, but his premise remains strong
with most numbers. In any given population, there are likely to be some proportion of men, or some
propensity in most men, to produce some children that they do not support. Id. At 151-154
50
The history of abandonment, discussed briefly earlier, also suggests that failing to support some of one’s
biological issue is common enough to be considered natural.
51
For a discussion of how the law might deal with the insights of evolutionary biology for rape and
exploitation within marriage see Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 805
(2000). For a discussion of the tendency of step-parents to abuse children, see Margo Wilson & Martin
Daly, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living with Stepparents, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 215, 218-19 (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987).
52
As I have previously argued, biology can reveal how brutal life looks like without normative convictions,
but it cannot tell us what our normative convictions are or should be. See Baker, supra note 51 at 806
(“[b]y laying bare the harsh reality of nature, [biology can] force[] us to embrace our normative
convictions”). See also DAWKINS, supra note 44 at 3 (“a society based simply on the gene’s law of
universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live.”)
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that nature answered the question of who should support children, all nature does is tell
us that some biological parents will and some biological parents will not.
C. Causation and Morality
This brings us to the second reason Blackstone gave for why biological parents should
support their children – causation. To many, this may also seem like an obvious, moral
justification for holding biological parents responsible.53 One is responsible for that
which one creates. Recent philosophical inquiries into this simple reasoning suggests
that a system of bionormativity is far from logically inevitable, however. Though their
reasoning differs, the scholars who have analyzed whether causation serves as an
adequate justification for holding biological fathers responsible for child support
uniformly find that it does not.
In her article on this subject, British feminist scholar Sally Sheldon highlights what most
legal philosophers accept as a matter of course, “factual causation does not fix legal or
ethical duties without something more.”54 She then discusses what Blackstone and others
suggest as the “something more” -- the voluntary act of intercourse on the biological
parents’ part. Because a woman and man voluntarily have sex, and that sex could result
in a pregnancy, that woman and man are responsible for the child. Voluntariness does
not do the work that one would need it to in order to impose the obligation either though.
Given that in most Western societies the decision to carry a pregnancy to term is vested
solely in the woman,55 the voluntary decision to engage in sex seems at least one step
removed from the critical decision of whether to bring a child into the world.56 The
woman carrying the fetus, who has the exclusive right to terminate the pregnancy or not,
is the much better proximate cause of the child’s birth.57
Sheldon focuses on abortion, but contemporary adoption law places a comparable degree
of control in the mother’s hands. If the father wants to relinquish the child for adoption
and the mother does not, the child is not surrendered and the biological father is still
responsible for child support. In this sense, a mother is able to cause a father’s on-going
responsibility, by refusing to let him relinquish it. He is not able to do the same thing.
53
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Sally Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?, 66
MODERN L. REV. 175, 181 (2003), citing H.L.A. HART AND A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(1959).
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If the mother wants to put the child up for adoption and the father does not, she can
simply “lose” the biological father, by running away from him, by not telling him that she
is pregnant or by saying the biological father is someone else. These strategies may not
be completely legal, but neither are they uncommon.58 He has a very difficult time
forcing her to accept parenthood. The mother simply has much more control over
whether and in what circumstances the child can come to be. Again, this makes her far
more responsible for causing the child and its dependency.
Sheldon goes on to argue that even if the decision as to whether to bear the child were
equally shared, factual causation with an element of voluntariness could not be all that is
necessary to impute responsibility or parents would be responsible for their dependent
adult children also. Most societies accept collective responsibility for dependent adults in
a way they do not for dependent children and the answer as to why does not have to do
with voluntary causation.59
A British philosopher, John Eekelaar, asks a question akin to Sheldon’s in his article,
“Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for their Children?” He concludes maybe.60
What any one individual’s duty to others is will depend on the circumstances in which
one finds oneself and others.61 If a man is drowning while a mother and a baby sit on an
adjacent beach, we do not say that the drowning man is dependent on the baby. He
depends on the mother because she has the ability to help him. And, if there were another
adult on the beach, we would probably say that the drowning man is dependent on the
58

Raquel X is probably the most famous example of the mother not being able to proceed with the
adoption over the father’s wishes, In the Matter of Raquel Marie X, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990) (father has
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pregnancy hidden from the father, or blocked him out of the baby’s life for a sufficient period of time, there
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certainly a controversial one.
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Eekelaar, supra note 18.
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See Jeffrey Bluestein, Child Rearing and Family Interests in HAVING CHILDREN 115, 116 (O’Neill &
Ruddick eds., 1979 (“The biological fact that parents have caused their children to exist is not itself
morally decisive. The moral issue is not who caused the child to exist but who is to bear primary
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second adult, because we would assume that the mother needed to care for the baby.
Comparably, we do not say that an orphan is dependent on her biological parents -- they
are not there; she must depend on someone else. Who she depends on will depend on the
social networks available, just as who the drowning man depends on will depend on the
social networks available. The moral duty toward specific children therefore “frequently
fall[s] primarily [on parents] for no other reason than their physical proximity to their
children.”62 That physical proximity can vary widely across cultures, however.
Different cultures assign responsibilities for providing for children (and the elderly)
differently.63
Eekelaar is a scholar of law and philosophy, but a brief foray into the anthropological
literature strongly bolsters his argument. As has been known for decades, many cultures
employ notions of both social fathers and biological fathers.64 Social fathers are often the
ones who assume the primary responsibility for providing for the child. This custom is
particularly widespread in Africa, where fosterage (sending one’s children to be raised by
others) is common. In Botswana, the role of social father is often assumed by a mother’s
brother or a mother’s subsequent husband. In either case, the biological father is not held
responsible for support of the child.65 The Baatombu society of North Benin encourages
all severance of biological ties so that “an individual expresses shame when claiming
ownership over his biological children.”66
Other cultural practices include sexual and marital arrangements in which it is very
difficult for anyone to determine biological paternity. One polyandrous culture in West
India assigns paternity by lot, by mother’s choice or by birth order of the fathers,
depending on the situation.67 Children in this community are often acknowledged by
many fathers, but only one mother.68 The idea of multiple paternity is also common
throughout the tribal regions of South America. These cultures believe that more than
one man’s genetic connection is necessary for conception. A child’s fathers include
every man that has had intercourse with the mother around the time of conception and all
of a child’s fathers help provide for the child. 69
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Eekelaar, supra note 18 at 351.
For an examination of the different legal approaches to filial responsibility laws, see generally, Seymour
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66
Erdmut Alber, Denying Biological Parenthood: Fosterage in N. Benin, 68 ETHOS 487.
67
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The historical and cultural evidence thus easily sustains Eekelaar’s ethical conclusion that
“the duty to care for children is embedded in the conjunction of two sources. One is the a
priori duty to promote human flourishing . . . The other is derivative from the society
itself, for social practice determines the application of that duty within its structure.” 70
He concludes that parents are obligated to support their children not because they are
biologically related, but because our society says that biological parents should support
their children. He finds no ethical justification in the biological connection itself.
Tackling the issue of parental duties to support children in this country, family law
scholar Scott Altman finds a justification for current child support laws, but not in any of
the traditional places. Like Sheldon and Eekelar, Altman quickly rejects causation as a
valid basis of support because “although causation is relevant to legal and moral duties, it
is neither necessary nor sufficient for a duty, and is generally an unappealing principle for
distribution.”71 Altman argues that causation serves as a necessary precursor to duty
usually only when coupled with some other factor, like being especially well-suited to
meet a need, benefiting from the conditions that created the need, or committing a wrong
in the creation of a need. Some parents fall into these categories, but not all do.
Most biological parents may be particularly well-suited to meet the dependency needs of
their children, but that does not mean that a moral duty to support exists in those parents
who are not. Biological parents who engaged in heterosexual sex may also have derived
some benefit from creating the needy child, but, as Altman argues, the passing joy of
sexual pleasure is awfully small compared to the very large financial liability of child
support. Moreover, it is not appropriate to assume that all reproductive acts involve
sexual pleasure, even for men. Finally, while traditional paternity law was very much
rooted in the idea that a wrong had been committed in the creation of the need,72
extramarital sex is no longer seen as a valid basis for punishment. Thus it is not clear that
there is “another factor” that makes the causation rationale persuasive.
Altman discusses and dismisses a number of other justifications for placing the child
support burden on parents, including the idea that child support represents the prepayment of a debt,73 or meets policy goals of gender equality,74and population control.75
His ultimate rationale for our child support system is not rooted in any of these ideas, but
instead reflects tort-like damages for what Altman identifies as two parental wrongs (i)
failing to demonstrate love for a child and (ii) failing to maintain a sustainable
70

Eekelaar supra note 19 at 351. See also Bluestein, supra note 61 at 117 (“biological parents may be
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Id. at 183-186. While child support enforcement probably does curb population growth somewhat, this is
a controversial goal particularly for the United States.
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relationship with the other parent. This first wrong depends on Altman’s premise that
children experience a parent’s failure to pay child support as a sign that the parent does
not love the child. Payment of child support prevents the child from feeling abandoned.
The second wrong relies on the evidence that children do better in two parent
households.76 If one fails the child by forcing it to grapple with the competing loyalties
of a separated family, one must pay for that harm.
Altman’s tort theory is provocative and may well justify the current legal models for
child support in cases of divorce77 but it is not a model that explains biological
parenthood liability at all. Indeed, it is a model deeply evocative of the marital regime
we are supposedly leaving behind. Among other things it would seem to place the child
support duty on a husband who was not biologically related to a child of the marriage
before it placed liability on the biological father. This may well be an appropriate result,78
but is hardly one that suggests that biological truth should trump marital presumption.
Altman’s theory also provides weak support for the realistically atypical but theoretically
prototypical “one-night stand” father.79 If it is no longer appropriate to punish the adults
who engage in casual sex because casual sex is not itself immoral, it is hard to see why
we should operate from a baseline which assumes that two people who sleep together
have a moral obligation to commit to an on-going family relationship. More important,
Altman’s theory of harm simply does not work if the child’s psychological needs for love
and stability are met by someone other than biological parents.80 Thus, though he
explains why the break-up of a traditional family should engender child support liability
in the adults who split up, he does not explain a biologically-based child support system.
* * * *
The strength of the norm for biological parenthood thus must be found in places other
than, or at least in addition to, history, nature and morality. Biological parents may be the
adults most likely to take care of children, but that does not prove that we have always
76
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required them to, that they have a biological interest in doing so, or that they are morally
compelled to do so. Biological parents do help create a child’s dependency, but so do
other people and so do the social norms into which the child is born. The next section
takes a closer look at why certain interest groups might have a particular interest in
maintaining the norm of biological parenthood.
II. Who Benefits from Bionormativity
A.

State’s Interest

The history discussed in Part I suggests one obvious state interest in a bionormative
system, money. A bionormative system helps identify two private sources of financial
support for each child. The more children are provided for by private parties, the less the
state needs to provide for them. Because a bionormative system appears to make
parenthood a pre or extra legal fact, the state is also able to avoid, for the most part,
qualitative assessments of parenting. Biology determines who parents are, the state does
not. In addition, a bionormative system reifies the binariness of parenthood. There are
two and only two biological parents of a child. A discussion of how the state benefits
from all of these attributes of bionormativity follows.
The British Poor Laws in the 16th century and the United States Federal Child Support
Act in the 20th century were both motivated by a desire to recoup state funds paid to poor
children. Not all countries are as motivated to pass the cost of children on to private
parties,81 but many clearly are. The United States, with its steadfast resistance to greater
state support of children,82 leads the industrialized world in its resistance to public
support of children.83 This resistance to supporting children reflects basic principles of
classical liberalism, which views the state’s role as limited to protecting people’s
negative rights84 and depends on a clear divide between the public (where all individuals
are seen as equal rights-bearing citizens) and the private (where inequalities may exist but
needs of dependents are met altruistically, without state interference).85 For a variety of
reasons, the United States’ allegiance to the norms of classical liberalism appear stronger
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than many of its peer countries.86 A state that sees itself as responsible for supporting
children needs not only figure out what children need, it needs to articulate why children
are entitled and where the entitlement should come from. A minimalist state can avoid
establishing the apparatus necessary to answer these questions by passing the obligation
for children onto private actors.
One of the ways the United States passes that obligation onto private actors is in our child
support doctrine. Any child not residing with an adult who is legally responsible for
providing for that child is entitled to child support payments from the non-resident parent.
The state determines this obligation, but what the child is entitled to is a function of what
her parents earn, not a function of what the child needs. Child support doctrine
purposively ignores the question of how much it costs to raise a child.87 Defenders of
this methodology contend that inquiries about what children need lead to “answers that
focus on some minimum level of subsistence.”88 Focusing on what children need thus
might disadvantage children of wealthier parents who, arguably, should receive more
than just what they need. So, in the name of making sure wealthy children get their share
(or perhaps in the name of ensuring that wealthy men pay their share), we conceptualize a
child’s entitlement as having little to do with the child and everything to do with the
parents.89 This leads to a nation in which 13.5 million children live below the poverty
level and 29.2 million live in households that cannot meet their children’s basic needs.90
This childhood poverty is not perceived to be the responsibility of the state precisely
because children are the responsibility of their biological parents.91
Another way in which the state passes the child support obligation onto private actors is,
in some instances, to ignore biological parenthood. Although these cases seem at first to
reject bionormativity, in some respects, they affirm it. A survey of cases in which nonbiologically related men were found responsible for child support suggests that paternity
doctrine can be as much about biparenting as it is about biology.92 When confronted with
an extant parenting relationship that is not rooted in biology, courts often refuse to make
86
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biology primary. The marital presumption is the most famous example of this, but even
as its importance ebbs, courts find other ways of ignoring biology if biological
parenthood runs the risk of leaving the child without adequate resources. Sometimes a
non-biological father is held responsible simply because the biological father cannot be
found. 93 In other cases, a biological father may be available but the non-biological father
was there first or is better able to provide, so the court refuses to order biological tests. 94
Other times courts favor finality (of a prior paternity order) over biological evidence.95
As long as the child is being supported by two parents, the law often blinks the biology
question.
Obviously, at some level, these cases suggest weak state support for bionormativity –
after all, these cases vest parental responsibility in someone other than a biological parent
- but these cases also show a very strong allegiance to binary parenthood. These courts
do not contemplate the idea of tripartite parenthood (even though there are often 3
obvious candidates for parental status), and they are very resistant to leaving a child with
just one parent (even if there often only one person who is biologically related.) The
arbitrariness of this system, in which whether a biological father is roped into or free to
establish his fatherhood depends on a set of situations he may have nothing to do with,
and whether the non-biological father remains a father can depend on the fortuity of
being able to locate the biological father, might strike us as quite odd, were it not for the
undeniable binariness of biological parenthood. Biologically there are always two and
only two parents. The law adheres to biology’s binary commandment even as it ignores
biology itself. If biological parenthood weren’t the norm, this allegiance to two would be
much harder to justify.
The allegiance to two – particularly a heterosexual two - is very important to a liberal
state though. The state wants two parents because if there is only one, that one is likely to
be a woman and women often do not have enough resources to raise a child.96 Enforcing
a minimum of two makes it much more likely that men’s resources will get to children.
But more than two gets tricky. The more people with claims to a child, the more courts
have to make decisions with regard to what is in a child’s best interest because the more
likely it is that one of the parents will be challenging the parenting work of others.
Whenever legal parents are separated, the court is responsible for resolving child-rearing
disputes between them.97 Given the number of children of divorced or never married
parents today, courts already do a great deal of this work, but no one thinks courts are
93
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particularly good at it, and courts resist it.98 The more parents with competing claims to a
child, the higher the likelihood that the state becomes involved in the day-to-day business
of parenting. A liberal state does not covet this role and may not be well served by it.99
“[A]ffirmative sponsorship of ethical, religious or political beliefs [that is, much of what
constitutes parenting] is something we expect the state not to attempt in a society
constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.” 100
Thus, a liberal state prefers a parental norm that keeps parental legal disputes to a
minimum, while ensuring access to enough resources for the child. By minimizing the
number of people who can claim parental rights, while ensuring that there are at least two
potential sources of support for a child, bionormativity serves the state’s interest.
Finally, and related, the state is attracted to a bionormative system because just as it
allows the state to avoid day-to-day parenting decisions, it allows the state to avoid most
initial parentage determinations. Most biological parents do want to take on the
emotional and financial burdens of parenthood. Because they do, the state does not have
to expend resources establishing parental status. By rooting parenthood in biological fact
rather than, for instance, intent to parent or ability to parent, a bionormative system
requires no ex ante evaluation of parents. Adoption, which usually involves a staterequired examination of the potential adoptive parents is the one traditional exception.101
For all other parents, the state appears to leave the parentage decision to nature.102
The state thus benefits from the privacy of bionormativity because the state does not have
to pay for children. It benefits from the exclusivity of bionormativity because the state
does not have to entertain competing claims to parenthood. It benefits from the
binariness of bionormativity simply because the number two appears to appropriately
balance the first two state priorities, relying on private funding and limiting the class of
parents. Finally, the state benefits, indirectly, from the biology of bionormativity
because it appears to make parenthood a function of a question that the state has no
expertise to answer. This interest is not in biology, per se, but just in the fact that biology
usually provides a parentage answer so that the state does not have to.
B. Parents’ Interest in Bionormativity.
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The idea that biological parents might have an interest in bionormativity seems at once
ridiculously obvious and curiously difficult. It seems obvious because of course
biological parents want to parent their own biological children and not someone else’s.
Instinct, evolutionary biology and the rapidly growing reproductive technology business
all suggest that if possible, people would rather parent children who share their genetic
material.103 The fact that most people who want to parent would prefer a genetic link
does not mean that all people who have a genetic link want to parent, however. What
interest do biological parents have in a system that confers parental status on those who
do not want it? Phrased this way the question seems much harder. The argument that
follows suggests that biological parents, like the state, are attracted to the private and
exclusive nature of bionormativity.
Most people probably decide to parent because they believe that the emotional and
financial costs of having children are worth the benefits that one receives.104 Indeed,
scholars argue that the child support obligation might be justified as the legitimate price
to be paid for the benefits that parents receive from parenting. 105 Support for this
supposition comes with the data showing that the vast majority of child support that gets
paid gets paid without any state enforcement effort.106 That is, most parents willingly
embrace their responsibility to support their children. These parents also might embrace
financial aid from the state to help ease the financial burden of parenting, though. Why
turn down money? The answer to that turns on how an acceptance of government aid
could undermine the private nature of parenting.
It is interesting to note that in this country, unlike peer countries, when the government
does provide aid to any parents other than the very poor, it does so in the form of a tax
cut or tax exemption, not a universal child allowance.107 Aid is thus packaged as money
being returned, not as active state participation in parenting. This conceptualization
conforms to notions of a minimalist liberal state, a state that plays no role in the support
of children. In doing so, this conceptualization also protects what has emerged in this
country as a fairly solid understanding of parental autonomy. Along with the
responsibility to raise children on their own, comes the right to raise children without
state interference, a right protected because it is part of the “private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.”108
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Although not without controversy,109 the constitutional right to “bring up [a] child in the
way he should go”110 is safely vested in parents.111 “The “primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is . . . established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.”112 A child must not be viewed as “the mere creature of the state.”113 Vesting
the right to raise and socialize children in parents is thought critical to ensuring a
pluralistic citizenry, one that has proper respect for the concept of individual liberty and
individual rights.114
Vesting parents with the “right, coupled with the high duty”115 to socialize children
clearly serves parents’ interests. Human rights charters, constitutions and popular
sentiment often consider parenthood central to human flourishing.116 It is thought
central to people’s lives because children provide unique bonds of love that give meaning
and depth to our lives.117 Rearing children is often also a deeply expressive activity.
“Child-rearing is one of the ways in which people fulfill and express their deepest values
about how life is to be lived.”118 The degree of sacrifice and the relentless need to step
outside of one’s own self-interest allow parents to achieve a transcendent form of
selflessness that is very difficult to replicate in any other context.119
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To a certain extent, these expressive and constitutive aspects of parenting require privacy.
In order to rear children in a manner that expresses “our deepest values about how life is
to be lived,” we must have freedom from too much state intervention in the process.120 In
order to feel genuine love, one must generate the sentiment from within, not have it
imposed from outside. Comparably, in order to achieve the kind of ennoblement that
parenthood can provide, one must find that selflessness inside oneself. The ability to
realize a rich and ennobling life as a parent thus may depend in part on a
conceptualization of parenting as a private enterprise.
Government support of children jeopardizes that parental privacy. Once the government
starts financing activities that have been protected as private, the protection usually falls
away.121 Parents’ right to be free from a meddlesome government dictating how their
children are to be reared, educated, and loved depends on the government delegating (or,
perhaps, never entertaining the idea of accepting) the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood.122
Biological parents also clearly have an interest in the exclusive nature of biological
parenthood. In a system in which the status of parent is a direct function of genetic
connection and only genetic connection, biological parents simply do not have to worry
about that status being taken away. As a matter of biology, one is or is not a parent. The
only qualifying characteristic biology demands is genetic connection and nothing in
nature can sever that genetic connection. The exclusivity of biology delegitimizes
attempts by others or by a not-so-liberal state to dictate the terms pursuant to which one is
allowed to become a parent or stay a parent.
A parental regime that was based on something like parental effort, or intent, or assumed
responsibility, would require much more state interference. Depending on the situation in
which the child was born and raised, there could be many people claiming parental rights.
The state would have to determine parental status based on nuanced and difficult-todocument evidence of love and investment, not on clear objective evidence of genetic
connection. Thus, willing biological parents who would parent and support their children
120
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anyway benefit from a regime that imposes parental status on unwilling biological
parents because such a regime, for the most part, keeps the state out of the parenting
process. Bionormativity reifies the notion that children are a private good, not public
responsibility and it thereby reinforces willing parents’ claims to freedom from too much
state intervention.
Parents’ attraction to binary parenting is a little more nuanced. As individuals, parents
might prefer a regime that vested exclusive parental rights in one, not two parents.
Divorcing parents fighting over custody almost certainly feel this way, as do many nevermarried mothers.123 Thus, parents’ attraction to binary parenthood probably depends on
the existence of state support. If a parent could assume state support, that parent would
probably have little interest in a binary norm. If that parent wanted to share the parenting
process, he or she could, but the choice would up to the parent, not the state. Parental
rights could be exclusively granted to one.124 If one cannot assume state support,
though, binary parenthood allows adults to share the duties of providing and caring.
Supporting a child, while simultaneously caring for that child, is often simply too
onerous for a single parent. Binary parenting allows the burdens to be shared without
allowing the benefits to become too diffuse. A strong allegiance to two helps keep third
parties at bay. In other words, a strong allegiance to binary parenthood is a strong
allegiance to exclusive parenthood and serves parents’ interests in freedom from too
much intrusion from others. On balance, then, given uncertainty as to state support,
traditional parents probably favor a binary regime.
Finally, parents have some interest in a biological norm simply because most people
parenting are parenting their own genetic issue. These parents need not go through a
qualification process before they are considered parents (though if their parenthood is
challenged, they might have to submit to testing). Such a qualification system might be
onerous (a judicial determination of intent or ability to parent, for instance) or incredibly
easy (conclusive parenthood vested in whosever name was on a birth certificate), but, at
the moment, most parents are able to assume parental status without having to go through
any registration system at all. 125
C. Children’s Interest
Any discussion of children’s interests should probably start with the premise that it is
incredibly difficult to ascertain children’s interests in the abstract. With the exception of
some unassailable truths about children needing love, support, and attention, little can be
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proved about what is best for children because multiple causation problems make reliable
empirical studies of family life almost impossible to design.126 Nonetheless, most people
agree that we must consider children’s interests in any question about parenthood and
many people probably think that children’s interests should be primary. As this section
will show, children’s interests in bionormativity are not the same as the state’s or
parents’. While most children share an interest in the private aspects of bionormativity,
their interest in exclusive parenthood is more muted and their interest in binary
parenthood is more muted still. Moreover, children seem to have what is potentially the
strongest interest in the biology of biological parenthood. There is evidence that children
may be best served if raised by their biological parents, though the evidence is far from
definitive.
To the extent that norms a bionormative regime usually provides children with homes in
which they are loved and reared without meddling from the state or other third parties,
children benefit. Children need to feel like they belong somewhere.127 The less a child
belongs to any one parent, or set of parents, the less that child may feel like he belongs to
someone or something. Children also need to know and be taught not only specific
values, but a belief system from which they can evaluate the world around them.128
Children need to know “what it is to have a coherent way of life . . . [in which they
experience] caring, long-term relationships with others.”129 As Emily Buss writes,
“[p]arents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of
their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and
pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances.”130 If children’s dependency
and child-rearing needs are seen primarily as public obligations, not private
responsibilities, children may be deprived of the intense, value-laden socialization
processes that private homes can provide.
Children’s interest in the exclusive nature of bionormative parenting is somewhat more
complicated. To the extent that children benefit from stable, non-acrimonious home
environments, they benefit from a regime in which parents and potential parents are not
fighting with each other over parental rights. The more adults debate and clash over how
to raise a child the less coherent the child’s way of life. The fewer adults with potential
relationship rights to a child, the less likely that there will be a fight. But to the extent
that children develop important emotional relationships with adults other than their legal
parents, they may also have an interest in multiple parenthood. Exclusive parenthood
often deprives children of some of the most meaningful relationships in their lives.131
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The more likely it is that those meaningful relationships will develop with non-traditional
parents, the less interest children have in exclusive parenthood.
As far as children’s interest in binary parenting is concerned, much has been written
about how much children benefit from the presence of two parents. Sara McLanahan,
probably the leading researcher on the subject of children in single parent families
concludes “ children who grow up apart from one of their parents are disadvantaged
across a broad array of outcomes. In fact, in almost any measure child well-being that
you look at, these children are disadvantaged.”132 McLanahan concludes that half of the
disadvantage that children of single parents experience is due to economic factors: single
parent homes have less money than two parent homes. But, there is still a significant
amount of hardship that children of single parents endure for reasons that have nothing to
do with economic resources. Much of it probably comes from the fact that parenting
involves emotional and physical investment, not just financial investment. One person
simply cannot provide as much emotional and physical support as can two. Numerous
scholars cite this as proof that children benefit from having two parents for reasons that
have nothing to do with economics.133
It is important to underscore what McLanahan’s research does not say though. Most
important, it says very little about the advantages of having two separated parents. All of
McLanahan’s work focuses on the effects of having (or not having) two parents in the
household, not two parents in existence. In other words, McLanahan has something to
say about how divorce and failure to marry affects children, but little to say about how
binary parenthood affects children.
Children with more than one parent have more potential resources available to them.
Thus, children may be attracted to binary parenthood for the same reason that the state is,
but McLahahan herself has suggested that the harms from the conflict associated with
collecting support from never-married fathers outweighs the benefits of the extra
money.134 If this is right, forcing parenthood on unwilling parents is not in children’s
interest. Moreover, children of high-conflict marriage suffer real harm as a result of that
conflict and children of divorce are often hurt bteh conflict and tension that divorce
breeds.135 The custodial parent’s anxiety level is the most important factor in
predicting child well-being after divorce.136 Thus, though on the surface it might seem
132
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like children were attracted to binary parenting for the same financial reasons the state is,
children’s interest is more conditional. Children appear to have an interest in two
sources of support only if the process of getting that second source of support is not too
conflict-ridden. While the number two seems to make sense for both the state and
parents, because of the way in which it balances the need for resources with the desire for
limited access, children may not benefit from two. Even though two ensures mores
resources, children may be better off without those resources if there is too much conflict
associated with securing them. At the same time, if there are serious claims for parental
rights based on a real established relationship with a third adult, children may be better
off if those rights are respected. Binariness for binariness’ sake does not appear to meet
many children’s interests.
What really marks the difference in children’s interest in bionormativity though is
children’s interest in the biology of biological parenthood. Children may benefit from the
state imposing parental status on unwilling adults precisely because those unwilling
adults contributed genetic material to a child. There are, currently, medical benefits
associated with knowing the health histories of one’s genetic relatives. Being raised by
one’s biological parents helps ensure access to genetic information that can play an
important role in medical treatment. The rapid advances in genetic science have
increased the utility of this information, though advances will also, most predict, make
genetic history irrelevant. As we come to know more about the human genome and are
able to predict and treat based on an individual’s presenting DNA, family history, which
at best suggests likelihood of traits, will become much less important.137
There may also be psychological benefits associated with being raised by one’s biological
parents though. Some people argue that in order to have a healthy understanding of
oneself, one needs to know the source of one’s genetic material. Proponents of this
theory usually cite Erik Erikson for the idea that a healthy sense of identity requires
integrating one’s past into one’s present and one’s vision of the future.138 Living and
being cared for by one’s biological parents is arguably the best way to achieve that
healthy identity.
Identity theory owes its current legal prominence to the open adoption movement which,
in the 1960s, began to question whether the secrecy that had been employed to protect
both birth mother and adoptee actually hurt both birth mother and adoptee. Psychologists
137
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suggested that keeping biological origins secret led to a sense of “genealogical
bewilderment”139 in adoptees. They noted that many adoptees experienced a sense of
loss that was thought “more pervasive, less socially recognized and more profound” than
the kinds of parental losses other children might endure.140 As one psychologist put it,
“the desire to know one’s biological origins and parentage results from a deeply felt
psychological and emotional need, a need for roots, for existential continuity and for a
sense of completeness.”141 The psychologists argued that an adoptee “los[es] his place
on the intergenerational chain of being.”142
In a concerted effort to address these harms, adoption professionals began discouraging
sealed records and encouraging what has become known as open adoption. Now it is the
rule, rather than the exception, for a birth mother to know the family into which her
biological children will go. Adopted children and their families know and often keep in
contact with their biological mothers.143 For most adoptees today the black biological
box, that had been the hallmark of adoption, has been opened. Preliminary evidence
suggests that, while not perfect, open adoption systems work well.144
There is also another small, but growing, class of children searching for their biological
origins. Children born by virtue of artificial insemination, either into a married couple,
into a gay couple or to a single parent have begun to search for information about the
person who donated the gamete(s) with which they were conceived.145 Worldwide, there
is a growing trend to help them in their search. Great Britain recently passed legislation
ensuring that children born through egg or sperm donation have the ability to trace their
genetic origins.146 In response to an intense lobbying campaign by some ethicists,
Canada has enacted a prohibition on compensation for anonymous sperm or egg
donation.147 Sweden and New Zealand also have known-donor systems.148 In this
country, children of anonymous sperm donors cannot always find their genetic fathers,
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but they have had considerable success using the Internet to find half-siblings.149 Many
of these children are deeply curious about their genetic origins.
This policy movement in the adoption and technological reproduction areas suggests that
genetic connection matters to children. Perhaps that is all we need to conclude that
therefore children, a particularly vulnerable interest group, have an interest in
maintaining a biological parental regime. A closer look at the data may give us pause,
however, because while the data involving adopted children and children born with
donated gamete indicates that genetic connection matters, it does not tell us much about
why it matters.
Consider the sense of loss that has been identified as stemming from not knowing who
one’s biological parents are. This loss can easily be conflated with the loss of having
been relinquished. If the children born with the help of donated gametes (“DG
children”) turn out to experience the same amount of loss and confusion as adoptive
children, then it will be much easier to identify genetics as the source of the loss, but at
the moment there is too much static in the data. To date, DG children tend to express
their motivations more in terms of curiosity than pain.150
An adoptee is able to understand that she existed as a person, albeit a newborn infant,
when her biological parents, or at least her biological mother, relinquished parental
status. The adoptee existed as a baby and her birth mother left. The same cannot be said
for the genetic descendent of a sperm or an egg donor, whose genetic parents never know
her to exist at all and who relinquish parental status only in the remotest sense.
Moreover, as one adoption researcher put it, “adoption situations are not generally the
first choice for any member of the triad.”151 Such is not the case for children born to
single women by choice or into gay couples, whose birth situation often was their
parents’ first choice.152
149

Hello, I’m Your Sister, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, Web site, Most US sperm banks still only
distribute sperm from anonymous donors, but some do have provisions for donors who are willing to be
contacted at some time in the future.
150
Although not universally the case, the adoption narratives suggest much more pain and anger than do
the stories from the DG children. Compare the interviews from the recent newspaper articles on DG
children, e.g. Who’s My Daddy? TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, June 18, 2005; Who’s the Daddy?, THE
GUARDIAN (London) January 3, 2006, with the stories in LIFTON, supra note 138. The consistent
exception to this is the DG children born to heterosexual couples who were not told about the
circumstances of their birth until they were quite old. Those children usually feel strong anger at having
been lied to. See AJ Turner, A. Coyle, What Does It Mean to be a Donor Offspring, 15 HUM. REPROD.
2041, 2049 (2000) (“Secrecy in families is damaging.”)
151
Michael McGinn, Attachment and Separation: Obstacles for Adoptees, J. OF SOC. DISTRESS AND THE
HOMELESS 273, 273 (2000). The triad consists of the biological mother (who often would rather not be
pregnant or be in a position to keep the child), the adoptive parents (who would rather be having their own
genetically related child) and the child.
152
Golombok and MacCallum conclude that the DG children of lesbians and single mothers by choice,
most of whom are told from the beginning about the circumstances of their birth, are very well-adjusted. S.
Golombok & F. MacCallum, Practitioner Review: Outcomes for parents and children following nontraditional conception, 44 J. of CHILD. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 303, 311 (2003). Secrecy is not an option
for these non-traditional families and their embrace of a non-traditional family structure makes it clear that
they did not wish for something else. In contrast , DG children of heterosexual families are often not told

27

Just as important, any discussion of literature on biological connection and adoption cries
out for a recognition of gender differentiation. As several commentators have suggested,
adoptees who struggle with scant information and fantasies about their biological origins
usually have a picture of their birth as an immaculate conception.153 They are “virtually
amnesiac” about their birth father.154 Adoptees almost always search for their birth
mother first and their birth father, if at all, only after they have found their birth
mother.155 What they yearn for and dream about is a relationship with their birth
mother. If identity is about being rooted in one’s genealogical past, why do adoptees
clearly care more about their mothers? The disparate treatment of mothers and fathers by
adoptees suggests either that cultural scripts play a huge role in constructing the
adoptees’ mental health or that it is something other than genetic material per se that
adoptees care about.156
It is unlikely that we will get accurate answers as to how much biological connection
really matters to children before we have to make policy decisions about the importance
of genetic parenthood in a technologically advanced age. As mentioned, many countries
have already enacted legislation making it very difficult to erase the concept of biological
parenthood. If one is persuaded that the evidence from adoption is applicable and
about the circumstances of their birth because of family embarrassment and stigma associated with not
being able to reproduce “naturally.” Id. at 308. See also, Tuner and Coyle, supra note at 2049.
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providing financially. Adoptees may yearn for their biological mothers because they are told that it is
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Biology provides a slightly different reason for why adoptees care more about their mothers:
mothers had more to do with them being born. Although not quite immaculate, the biologists’ account of
human conception involves remarkably little work on the male’s part. See supra text accompanying notes
47-48. Intercourse often begins and ends the biological father’s contribution. If an adoptee feels
connected to, love for and anger at the people responsible for bringing him into the world and then
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persuasive in the donated gamete context then one should question whether we should
ever allow intending parents to obtain genetic material from others. If one is skeptical of
the adoption data and eager to facilitate more ways for different kinds of parents to
become parents, then one might be happy to make biological connection irrelevant. At
this point, the best one can probably say is that children may have an important interest in
maintaining a biologically based parental regime.
*****

In sum, while the state, parents and children all have an interest in maintaining a
bionormative system, what attracts each group to bionormativity differs and the strength
of that attraction can vary. The state seems most attracted to the financial ramifications
of a private regime. Parents seem most attracted to the parental autonomy associated
with a private and exclusive regime. Both the state and parents also benefit from a binary
principle that balances the need for resources with a preference for exclusivity. Children,
on the other hand, though they have some interests in privacy and exclusivity, have a
growing interests in non-exclusive parenthood, little interest in a binary principle, but
perhaps the greatest interest in biology for biology’s sake.

III. The Costs of Bionormativity

Despite the numerous advantages of bionormativity suggested above and notwithstanding
our remarkable modern ability to perfect a biological system, the norm of biological
parenthood appears to be in a bit of a crisis. The economic reality, reproductive practices
and parenting arrangements of a growing number of parents seem to belie
bionormativity’s universal desirability. In particular, the qualities of bionormativity that
make it attractive, it’s private, exclusive, binary and biological nature, are growing
increasingly controversial. This Part explores that controversy.
A. Funding for Children
The brief history of the paternity suit, explored earlier, suggests that money is one of the
main reasons the state is attracted to biological parenthood. The private construction of
parenthood allows the state to absolve itself of economic responsibility for children. The
desire of states to pass off responsibility for children explains why parish courts had such
an incentive to go after unmarried fathers in medieval England;157 it explains why
Parliament included paternity provisions in the British Poor Laws;158 and it explains why
the U.S. Congress mandated that states develop biological paternity rules and strict
guidelines for child support payment.159
157
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159
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Child support policy of the last 50 years makes clear, however, that a state eschews
economic responsibility for children at poor children’s expense. The United States, which
more than any other industrialized country insists that a bionormative regime can amply
provide for children, leads the western industrialized world - by a big margin – in child
poverty. 160 As indicated, just under 30 million children in this country live without the
resources necessary to meet their basic needs.161 This poverty is not just a function of
single mothers or deadbeat dads. The average unwed father earns just over $16,000 a
year.162 Just under half of low-income children live with married parents.163 Over half of
low-income children have at least one parent who works full-time, year-round.164 The
economies in which many of these parents live simply do not pay enough to support
children.
The private construction of parenthood does help the children of wealthy parents.
Children who live in families with incomes in the top 20% of the United States
distribution have higher standards of living than any other children in the world.165 Of
the 18 United States peer countries studied by Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding,
only the wealthy children of Switzerland and Canada had standards of living within 20%
of the wealthiest U.S. children.166 Middle income children in the United States also do
well, though not as well comparatively. Most middle income children in the
industrialized world come within 20% of the United States’ standard.167
The reason that the United States defines the extremes of childhood wealth and childhood
poverty among industrialized nations is that virtually all modern governments - except
the U.S. - transfer a significant amount of money from wealthy households to poor
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ones.168 In doing so, they reject a private construction of parenthood in favor of an ethic
that makes the well-being of children a collective responsibility. Rainwater and
Smeeding found that every one of the countries they studied (except the United States)
had a form of child or family allowance that went to children regardless of need.169 Most
of these countries also instituted a minimum guaranteed level of child support to single
parents in case the noncustodial parent could not or would not pay.170 In some countries
these guaranteed payments all but eliminated the economic disadvantages that single
parents faced. “In Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK, poverty rates for single
parent children are close enough to couples’ rates to not make a great difference in the
overall poverty rate.”171
All of the United States’ comparison countries have some provision for naming a
biological father and trying to secure support from him.172 None of these countries reject
the idea of biological parenthood completely, but neither do they construct
bionormativity as a private system from which emanates the totality of a child’s
entitlement. Nor do they seem to perceive parenthood as essentially binary. The
European states’ primary response to poverty is not to extract more or better support from
biological parents; it is to provide children with more support from the state. Much of this
support goes to single parents.173 As conservative critics rightly point out, this kind of
state intervention legitimates single parenthood.174 By doing so, state policy in Europe
undermines the essential binariness of biological parenthood.175
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If the United States were to assume substantially more responsibility for children,
however, it is likely that notions of parental autonomy would suffer. Recall that one of
the reasons that parents were willing to accept the private obligations of a bionormative
regime was that the right to parental autonomy seemed to follow. Conceptualizing
parenthood as a private enterprise, outside of the state’s legitimate sphere of influence or
duty, helps maintain a strong parental rights ethic. The state has no business interfering
in parenting decisions because the state has no business in parenting period. The more
the state assumes financial obligations for children, the more precarious a notion of
parental autonomy may become. The extent to which parental autonomy is not respected
for poor parents in this country certainly suggests as much.176
For instance, in Wyman v. James, the Supreme Court condoned a social worker’s search
of a welfare recipient’s home and endorsed the social worker’s intrusive questions about
parenting simply because the mother was receiving state aid. The court justified the
intrusion because it was the child, not the mother, who was the object of the state’s
concern, and because the state had a “paramount interest and concern in seeing and
assuring that the intended and proper objects of . . . assistance are the ones who
benefit.”177 If this reasoning is persuasive, then an expansion of state aid would likely
eviscerate parental autonomy.
The demise of parental autonomy is not inevitable though. In cases in which the child’s
family is not receiving public assistance, concern for the child has not, traditionally,
justified state intrusion.178 The cases from which parental autonomy doctrine emanates
actually suggest that children benefit from state deference to parents and are hurt by state
regulation of parents.179 If children benefit from a home environment in which parental
authority is clear and parents are free to transmit their own values,180 and if children
benefit from an authoritative structure in which parents, who have unique expertise vis a
176
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vis their own children, make decisions on behalf of them,181 then increased state support
for children need not necessarily lead to more state oversight of parenthood. If the
government was willing to spend money on children without setting up an apparatus to
make sure that the money was spent appropriately, then parenting could remain a private
right for the middle and upper class and could become a private right for the poor parents
who currently suffer from very intrusive state monitoring. 182
Thus, in theory, it is possible to separate out obligations for children from rights to
children. It is possible to give the state more responsibility for financing children without
giving the state more of a right to raise children, but this would require a strong reinvigoration of parental autonomy doctrine and a clear understanding of the reasons why
such a doctrine served children’s interests. In short, if the plight of poor children compel
making obligations to children more of a public responsibility, then it is likely that the
parents will lose much of the autonomy that they now enjoy, unless they are willing to
champion a strong child-centered parental autonomy doctrine that applies to rich and
poor alike.183
B. Functional Parenthood
If poor children and their advocates question the advantages of keeping responsibility for
children a private obligation, another constituency of children and their advocates
question the advantages of keeping parenthood an exclusive status. Recall that Part II
argued that some parents may be attracted to bionormativity precisely because a
biological norm underscores the exclusivity of parental status. Only two very specific
people can ever be the biological parents of a child. Today, though, an increasing
number of people are calling on courts to recognize as parents adults who have invested
time and money and love in children, regardless of whether they have a biological link.
Many of these functional parents are asking the state to reject the exclusivity of
bionormativity in order to reward them with rights, and some legal parents are asking the
state to reject the exclusivity of bionormativity in order to demand that those who have
enjoyed the status of parent continue to meet parental obligations.
Thousands of children in this country are parented by adults who are not their biological
parents. A number of studies and emerging caselaw suggest that a remarkably high
number of children are not biologically related to the man who thinks he is or has acted
as their father.184 The non-genetic relationships in these family configurations often
181
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present very sympathetic claims for legal recognition, as do the scores of relationships in
blended families. Almost 5 million children live with a step-parent and another 2.1
million live in households in which one of their biological or adoptive parents cohabits
with another adult. Another 2 million children live with a relative who is not a parent.
The non-parent adults in these children’s lives often want parental rights.
A variety of doctrines have grown up to allow non-related parents to acquire some
parental rights. Under the equitable parent doctrine, courts often estop a legal parent
from denying the parental status of someone who has acted as a parent and developed
emotional ties with the child.185 Courts also compel non-biological fathers on whom
children have acted as fathers and on whom children have relied to fulfill the legal
obligations of parent.186 In states that do not allow second parent adoption187 and even in
some states that do, gay and lesbian parents rely on notions of equitable or de facto
parenthood if they are to secure custody or visitation rights to children that they have
helped support and raise.188 Some states do not explicitly endorse either equitable or de
facto parent theories, but nonetheless allow adults who have formed parent-like bonds to
sue for visitation.189 In recognition of and sympathy for this line of cases, the American
Law Institute’s recently adopted Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
acknowledge rights of both non-biological equitable parents (who are given relationships
rights equivalent to legal parents) and non-biological de facto parents (who are given
somewhat lesser, but still substantial visitation rights).190
For some time, scholars have endorsed this less exclusive approach to parenthood in
order to recognize and honor the variety of rich and important connections that children
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develop with adults.191 Recognizing these relationships also rewards adults who, in some
sense, seem to have earned parental status. These calls to recognize more people as
parents, though, necessarily call for a rejection of traditional parental autonomy. There
is no way to pass judgment on these new relationships and at the same time honor the
parental prerogatives that the Constitution has previously protected. The only reason
non-legal parents are in court is because a legal parent does not want them to enjoy the
kind of access to the child that the non-legal parent wants.192 In order to assess whether a
non-legal parent should be granted legal rights, judges must make qualitative assessments
of emotional investment and connection and commitment. The extant parents are not free
to bring up children “in the way they should go,” nor do they have the “right coupled
with the high duty” to raise their children if it is the state’s job to determine parental
status or parental rights based on who has done a sufficiently good job of developing a
legally cognizable emotional connection with a child. In giving legal status to these
relationships, courts, thus, at once, make parenthood less private, less exclusive, less
biological and less binary.
C. DG Families
A wholly different group of people, one that is probably perfectly content with the notion
of private and exclusive parenting, but who use donated gametes to produce children that
they want to parent, is putting pressure on the biological dimensions of bionormativity.
To a certain extent, adoption law has always put pressure on the biological dimensions of
bionormativity, but adoption was always something of a special case. For the most part,
adoption has been viewed as a necessary, next-best solution, not an equal to biological
parenthood.193 The law has never been fully comfortable ignoring adoptees biological
origins,194 and adoption was seen as the answer to a situation in which both the biological
parents failed (by producing a child that they did not want or could not rear) and the
adoptive parents failed (by not being able to produce a child).195 In contrast, the
biological parents of children born through gamete donation have often not failed at
anything and the ultimate parents of DG children often prefer, from the outset, not to
produce a child the traditional way. Adoptive parents are seen as sympathetic but
normative because of their desire but inability to produce biologically; DG parents are
seen as non-normative because of their desire to circumvent the traditional biological
process.
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The way in which DG parents circumvent the traditional biological process is also
unnerving to some. For the most part, they use something like a contract to produce a
child. Most people who donate gametes for others to use or who use gametes that others
have donated, sign some form of document delineating who shall be considered parents
of the child. A donor who leaves his sperm with a sperm bank signs a document
absolving himself of rights and obligations with regard to any child produced with his
sperm.196 Egg donors sign similar documents. Surrogate mothers who become pregnant
with donated genetic material from others also sign contracts in which their rights as
parents are terminated. Although there is some controversy over whether courts enforce
these contracts as signed or look more carefully (than traditional contract doctrine would
require) at the intent of the parties,197 there is agreement that the preconception intent of
the parties is critical to the determination of who ultimately retains parental rights and
responsibilities.198 The standard for determining parentage in cases without explicit
elaboration of the future rights and obligations of the parties is also often one of
preconception intent.199 Thus, whether a woman goes to a sperm bank or gets in
informal donation from a friend, whether a man uses his spouse’s eggs to impregnate a
surrogate or uses donated eggs to impregnate his spouse, courts will usually determine
parentage not based on who contributed to the child’s genetic make-up, but who intended
to parent the child.200 An intent standard also makes true single parenthood possible.
One woman or one man can acquire the necessary reproductive material and services
with the intention of parenting alone.
By itself, a parental regime based on intent to parent is perfectly coherent. The law
grants parental rights and responsibilities to those who caused a child to come into being
with the intent of parenting that child once it was born. The problem, of course, is that
the system is wholly inconsistent with bionormativity and paternity doctrine, the purposes
of which are and always have been to make men who did not intend to parent, parents.
Preconception contracts allocating parental status for babies conceived through
conventional reproductive activities have always been void.201 We have never let men
and women agree to waive parental status before or after the intercourse that can lead to
conception.202 Indeed, paternity doctrine makes men who are incapable of consenting to
sex liable for child support and it makes men who were the victims of misprepresentation
196
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of fraud (with regard to birth control) parents.203 Inquiries into intent to be a parent thus
have everything to do with the parentage of DG children and nothing to do with the
parentage of children conceived through sexual intercourse.
The receptivity to the intent-based regime for DG children may not be surprising, though,
if one views the overriding concern of bionormativity as securing adequate resources for
children. Most of the people intending to create a child using reproductive technologies
(like most people who adopt children) have the resources to provide for the child. After
all, one needs resources to buy gametes and, in many instances, health care services. So
the exigency that arguably made paternity doctrine necessary in the first place is not
present. If the state does not need the biological parent’s money, it may care less about
biological connection.
Most of these reproductive technology contracts also draw a complete parentage picture.
As long as a court enforces the contract – or the preconception intent of the parties – it is
not called on to determine who will make the best or most appropriate parent; the parties
themselves decided that. To the extent that the state would rather steer clear of making
parentage determinations, enforcing these contracts allows it to do so.
Thus, there is much about the allocation of rights and responsibilities in these
reproductive agreements that conforms to the bionormative construction of parenthood –
parenthood is a private, exclusive arrangement that brings with it full financial
responsibility for children. As long as one doesn’t ask too many questions about the
origins of the child, DG families fit very neatly into the traditional bionormative
construction of parenthood. And DG parents clearly benefit from the privacy and
exclusivity associated with bionormativity. It has been the private provision of health
care services that has allowed the reproductive technology business to thrive,204 and
precisely because there are others with a biological link to their children, this group
probably feels very strongly that parenthood should not be a flexible or temporal status.
The more permanent and fixed their status as parents, the less they have to worry about
others encroaching on their rights.
The extent to which a parental regime based on intent must be a binary regime is
somewhat controversial. As suggested, single women (and occasionally single men) can
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intend to parent alone.205 Some state courts have made clear that single women using
donated sperm should not be subject to any kind of interference suit by the donor if she
intended to parent alone.206 On the other hand, courts often resist finding only one
parent,207 and at least one commentator has written that the law should not validate any
reproductive arrangement that contemplates only one parent for a child. Marsha Garrison
argues that because it is important for children to have two parents, single men and
women should not be able to contract for genetic material unless there is another adult
(either the donate provider or someone else) willing to assume full parental duties.208 If
no other adult is named, Garrison would make the gamete donor a parent.
Garrison’s proposal suggests that the use of donated gametes does not necessarily
undermine a notion of binary parenting. An intent standard by itself legitimates the
notion of single parenthood, but the law could override that conceptualization of
parenthood if binariness itself is considered important. In other words, the state can
impose a binary requirement even as it allows people to buy gametes for reproductive
purposes. Thus, deliberately subverting biological reproduction does not actually
undermine most of the core attributes of bionormativity. A system that incorporates the
use of donated gametes can stay private, exclusive and even binary.

At this point, we can design a table that helps synthesize the analysis presented thus far.
The interests of the constituencies that were discussed in Part II are outlined in Table 1,
Rows 1-3. The interests of the constituencies that have been discussed in Part III are
outlined in Rows 4-6. A “Y” indicates that a given constituency (Rows 1-6) have an
interest in the attribute (columns A-D) listed in the column. An “N” indicates that a
constituency is hurt by the given attribute. A “N/Y” suggest that he constituency may be
split in its interest of a given attribute. A “∅” indicates that the constituency is neutral as
to the attribute.
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14 GENDER AND SOC. 1 (2000) (“In 1990 alone, more than 170,000 single women odler than 30 gave birth,.
Among whilte womena dn women who attended college, the percentage who became mtoehrs without
marrying more than doubled during the 1980s; for women with professional or managerial jobs, it nearly
tripled”); Jennifer Egan, Wanted A Few Good Sperm, NY TIMES MAG. , 3/19/06 (interviews with single
women by choice).
206
Calif. In Jhordan C v. Mary K, 179 Cal App 3d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App 1986) (“The California
Legislature has afforded unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for
artificial insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity . . . “) In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35
(“an unmarried woman does not lose the protection of the artificial insemination statute simply because she
knows the donor . . . “) .
207
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Table 1

1. Minimalist
State
2. Traditional
Parents
3. Traditional
Children
4. Poor Parents
And
Children
5. Step or Other

C.
Binary
(2 and only 2
parents)

D.
Biological
(Genetic)

A.
Private
(no state $; no
state oversight)

B.
Exclusive
(no 3P parents)

Y

Y

Y

∅

Y

Y

Y*

Y

Y

N/Y

N

Y(?)

N**

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Functional
Families

6. DG Families

* If parents can assume state support of their children, their interest in binary, as opposed to unitary,
parenthood diminishes. If a parent can be assured of some state help in the financial cost of raising a child, they might
prefer to have their parental rights be exclusive. But, state support would likely also mean more state intrusion, so
parents might well prefer a binary regime that keeps parenthood private and includes two potential sources of support.
** Unlike most parents who prefer a conceptualization of parenthood as private so that their parental
autonomy is protected, poor parents have little lose in terms of parental autonomy (their rights are already limited) and
much to gain from greater state support of children. If, however, an increase in state funding was accompanied by a
strong, child-centered defense of parental rights, the square should have a N/Y, indicating that support could be public,
while parents were still given privacy to parent as they chose.

Table 1 brings some important conclusions into relief. First, the number of Ys scattered
throughout the chart, but particularly in the fist three rows, suggests that many people
benefit from the qualities associated with a bionormative regime. Second, the string of
“Ns” in row 5 makes clear that the practice that is most inconsistent with the core
attributes of bionormativity is not substituting state responsibility for parental
responsibility (row 4) or substituting one person’s genes for another (row 6), but giving
legal recognition to the relationships that, in fact, define children’s lives. Indeed, the
practice that one might suspect of being most at odds with a bionormative regime, that is,
a practice of purposively substituting biological contributions (row 6), seems to threaten
the core attributes of bionormativity very little. Meanwhile, more state support of
children (row 4), while it undermines the private construction of parenthood and its
essential binariness, is perfectly consistent with a regime that limits the number of people
who can be parents to any one child and with a regime that still puts a premium on
biological connection.
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E. Policy Implications
Below is a discussion of the consequences that are likely to flow from the different policy
decisions that might be implemented in response to the pressure currently being but on
bionormativity. Lest there be any doubt, allegiance to the various different attributes of
bionormativity does not break down on conventional political lines. Consider how
different people traditionally found on the Left might view the importance of parental
privacy. The last thing a middle class lesbian mother wants is a parental regime in which
children are seen as public goods so that here home life is subject to public regulation. A
poor woman on welfare is probably much more interested in seeing all children viewed as
a public responsibility because she needs more financial help and her parenting practicing
are already subject to regulation. By the same token, consider how people traditionally
found on the Right might view the importance of biology. Some conservatives might
would to insist on downplaying the importance of biology because they see the marital
family and not the biological one as what will best hold society together. Other
conservatives might advocate a strict biological regime so as to curb potentially reckless
male behavior, minimize state support and discourage scientific tinkering with God’s
design. Comparably someone eager to legitimate gay families may be enthusiastic about
a binary requirement for parenthood because a binary rule makes it more likely that a
non-biologically related partner/parent will retain legal status.209 Single parents eager to
be able to parent on their own may have little patience for a binary requirement.

1. State Support
If, like the traditional state (Row 1), one’s primary concern is in making sure that the
United States does not adopt the kind of child welfare systems that operate elsewhere,
then one must be wary of the extent to which one endorses any state regulation of
parenthood and one must be wary of granting third party rights. The more the state is
involved in regulating parental decision-making and the more it is involved in allocating
rights between interested adults, the less legitimate is the claim that the relationship
between parent and child is a private one and that the state has no obligation to support
children financially.
On the other hand, if one is primarily concerned with getting more state money to
children, particularly poor children, then Box 4A indicates that one must be prepared for
a likely increase in state regulation of parental behavior. State regulation of parental
209

The gay rights organizations that have played a role in disputes between biologically–related and nonbiologically related gay parents almost uniformly argue on behalf of the non-biologically related gay
parent. As one top gay family advocate explained, “our families are foreclosed from legal respect in most
places, and we think it breeds further disrespect for our families hen one of the parties takes the position
that there is a biological trump card. . . . “ E-mail from Mary Bonauto, Civil Rights Project Director,
GLAD, 2/23/07 (on file with author); see also William Rubenstein, Divided We Propogate: An
introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Chidl Custody in Same Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA
WOMEN’S L. J. 143, 144-45 (1999) (discussing ethical standards for gay organizations representing gay
parents in custody disputes).
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behavior does not necessarily lead to a greater acceptance of third party claims, however
(Box 4B). State support may give the state a greater claim to an interest in how a child is
parented, but it does not give third parties’ a greater interest. As indicated, it is also
possible to claim that children are entitled to more money from the state without
accepting greater state oversight, if one is prepared to make a strong child-centered
defense of parental autonomy. (See ** in Box 4A). With that regime, though, would
almost certainly come a less binary approach to parenthood because deference to parents
in an age of many divorced and separated parents means the state must prioritize parents
and choose which parent it will defer to.
State support of children would also diminish the need for a second source of support and
thus diminish the need for paternity doctrine. A decreased reliance on paternity doctrine
would, in turn, have implications for our general allegiance to biology (and thus our
approach to gamete donation) because there would be less need to rely on biology in
order to establish parental status in unwilling parents. In sum, more state funding of
children would likely lead to a less binary approach to parenthood whether it was
accompanied by a strong or weak parental rights doctrine and it would likely diminish
our allegiance to mandatory parenthood for biological parents.

2. Functional Parenthood
If one is concerned with giving legal recognition to the variety of relationships that
children experience as important, then one may need to dispense with most of the core
elements of bionormativity. There is much to be said in favor of recognizing functional
parenthood,210 but as Column B suggests, many people have an interest in parenthood as
an exclusive status. All of the child-centered arguments that favor a strong parental
autonomy doctrine,211 disfavor a more functional approach to parenthood because the
more the state is involved in dispensing parental rights to others, the more the state is
involved in orchestrating a child’s life. The more people who claim a right to rear a
child, the less coherent and unified a child’s sense of belonging is likely to be. The more
people who have rights with regard to a child, the more likely that the child will be the
subject of litigation battles – the consequences of which are notoriously bad for
children.212
There is also a certain asymmetry in expanding parenthood in this manner. As I have
argued elsewhere, there seems to be much greater affinity for expanding the rights of
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See Janet Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, in FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1994 at 172, 175 (Children of
high conflict divorce two to four times more likely to be clinically disturbed); MClanahan et al, Childsupport Enforcement and Child Well-Being, supra note at 254 (increased conflict associated with
collecting child support from never-married fathers may increase dangerous stress enough to outweigh
benefits of money)
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third parties than expanding the obligations of third parties.213 What the increasing
recognition of functional parenthood seems to be creating, in other words, is not just a
regime that contemplates more parents, but a regime that contemplates different levels of
parenthood, greater and lesser parenthood. Some parents have rights and obligations;
other parents just have rights.214 To the extent we are willing to accept greater and lesser
degrees of parenthood, we need to question the trends elsewhere in family law to treat all
parents as equal. Arguments for joint custody,215 arguments against the labels of
“custody” and “visitation” (precisely because they suggests a hierarchy),216 and much of
the rhetoric from Father’s Rights groups,217 reject a notion of hierarchical parenthood.
It is important to recognize, therefore, that a movement to recognize more parents –
which is almost certainly a movement to recognize different classes of parents - exists in
some tension with movements to equalize parental status.
Recognizing functional parenthood also has clear implications for other core attributes of
a bionormative regime. Because the process of recognizing functional parents requires
court intervention, parenthood becomes less private. This makes arguments against state
funding less compelling and thus makes state funding more likely. More state funding
leads to the consequences just discussed, less binary parenthood, lesser need for paternity
doctrine, potential degrees of parenthood. Recognizing functional relationships also
clearly makes parenthood less biological and that has implications for the question of
what kind of regime should govern for children born with donated gametes.

3. Binary Parenthood
As discussed, Marsha Garrison has made the case for binary parenthood. Garrison argues
that children are better served by a regime that insists on two parents. She would thus
prohibit the current practice of single adults acquiring genetic material from a bank or
some other party and parenting alone. Nothing in Garrison’s argument precludes an
expansion of parental rights beyond two people, but a strong belief in two does weaken
213
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the argument for governmental support of children because two parents provide two
sources of income. In essence, she argues that the financial incentives that encouraged
states to insist on two parents inure to children’s psychological benefit. Children’s
emotional needs and the state’s bottom line are both served by insisting on two parents.
Requiring two parents in a world with non-monogamous living patterns and readily
available genetic material will put pressure on the idea of equal parenthood, however.
When we compel an unwilling person to be a parent or force a person who wants to
parent alone to name a co-parent, we are likely, again, to endorse a parental regime in
which there are degrees of parenthood. There will be one parent who does the
overwhelming amount of parental work and who is likely, therefore, to be afforded more
parental rights. Children in these situations will experience their second parent as many
children of “single mothers” do today, a person who is known to exist and might play a
marginal role in the child’s support, but does not play a significant emotional, financial or
physical role in the child’s life.218
In analyzing the recent history of child custody, David Meyer has posited that we have
seen the pendulum swing from the “old” regime in which non-custodial parents (usually
fathers) were clearly considered lesser parents,219 to a belief that parental rights and
responsibilities should be equally shared,220 and now maybe a bit back again (at least for
constitutional purposes) to a regime in which non-custodial parents have decidedly fewer
parental rights.221 There may be nothing wrong with this unequal treatment of parents.
In some ways it reflects what some feminist family law scholars have advocated when
they call for greater legal recognition of the obvious social fact that women do the vast
amount of caretaking work.222 It also reflects the stability values that Freud, Goldstein
and Solnit emphasized years ago when they encouraged courts to award custody to the
one real psychological parent.223
Recognizing one parent as primary when there are other parents has costs though. It
legitimates the idea of degrees of parenthood and thereby makes it harder for everyone to
view parenthood as an equally shared enterprise. This hinders the efforts of other feminist
reformers who yearn for men and women to share parenting work more equally,224 and it
218
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hinders the efforts of non-custodial parents who yearn to play a more significant role in
their children’s lives. One could have a regime in which parents who invested unequally
were treated unequally and parents who invested equally were treated equally, but
determining the equality of parental investment is notoriously difficult. Different parents
parent in different ways and invest in different ways. The very existence of second-class
parenthood makes it harder for people who want equal treatment because they will likely
have to prove that they are equal. Enforcing a binary requirement increases the number
of unwilling and reluctant parents and therefore increases the number of unequal
parenting arrangements. It thus probably clearly does damage to a presumption of equal
parenting.
4. Biology
Finally, if one is moved by the arguments in Part IIC that children benefit from being
raised by biological parents, then one must turn one’s attention to Table 1, Column D.
Boxes 5D and 6D suggest that if biology is a real concern, then one must be wary of
granting third party rights to non-biological parents and one must be wary of allowing
any donation of gametes. If children really are best served by being raised by biological
parents then perhaps we should ban not only anonymous gamete donation,225 but all
gamete donation. A ban on gamete donation, in the name of protecting biological links,
would be perfectly consistent with and might even countenance greater state support for
children. If one thinks that parenthood really should, if at all possible, be defined by a
biological connection, then one probably would endorse greater state support of children
because greater state support makes it more likely that poor parents have access to the
resources necessary to raise their children.
The data with regard to the importance of biology is far from clear, however.226 If one
rejects the importance of biology completely, one can readily accept not only gamete
donation but anonymous gamete donation.227 If, instead, one would prefer to hedge one’s
bets and make biology relevant though not necessarily primary, then a solution might lie,
as it appears to elsewhere, in degrees of parenthood.228 Gamete donation would be
permissible as long as children produced with donated gametes had access to their
donees. If children can avoid the feelings of abandonment and isolation discussed in Part
IIC by simply knowing and having some access to the people who gave them their
genetic material, then, again, what we may need is a more fluid understanding of
225
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parenthood, one that involves a variety of adults who may have different levels of rights
and responsibilities. A genetic parent would not likely be responsible for child support,
but might have some form of visitation rights. This is a construction of parenthood that
looks very much like the world of parenthood that is emerging to meet the needs of
functional families, discussed above (Table 3, Row 5): Parenthood as a non-exclusive
status, that often involves multiple adults with different rights and responsibilities and
necessarily leaves room for the state to mediate the disputes that arise between those
adults.

***

The arguments against this more fluid construction of parenthood are the arguments for
exclusivity and privacy (Columns A and B) and the arguments for equal parenting. If
children really do benefit from strong parental rights and a limited number of adults who
claim a role in rearing them; if children are hurt when a Big Brother State starts dictating
parenting practices, if many mothers and fathers would prefer a world in which the
obligations of parenthood were shared equally, then the benefits of constructing a more
fluid understanding of parenthood may not be worth the costs. Moreover, if parents
really benefit from having the confidence and assurance that their parenting is not subject
to second-guessing then there is real danger in creating new classes of parents with
different rights and responsibilities. Policymakers must decide whether the importance of
genetic connection trumps the advantages of privacy and exclusivity, just as they must
decide whether the importance of established relationship trumps the advantages of
privacy and exclusion. In doing so, they must be careful to be collaterally consistent. A
regime that favors the exclusive rights of intended parents who used donated gametes
should probably not simultaneously champion a functional parenthood approach because
functional parenthood assessments severely undermine parental privacy and exclusivity.
Comparably, if one believes that children must be granted rights of access to their genetic
parents, one must be prepared to embrace other forms of multiple parenthood. If one
accepts multiple parenthood with the recognition that there will be greater and lesser
forms of parenthood, one must reject the presumption of equal parenthood in more
traditional divorce contexts as well.

Diagram 1 help illustrate the interconnected nature of the consequences of all of these
policy decisions:
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Diagram 1:

IV. Conclusion

The analysis presented here makes clear that legal parenthood need not be synonymous
with biological parenthood. It has not been historically and it need not be ethically. A
biological regime still holds many attractions though, not just because biological
connection itself may be an appealing basis for parenthood, but because of the way in
which a biological regime constructs parenthood as a private, exclusive and binary
enterprise. This paper has evaluated how these core attributes of biological parenthood
are threatened by contemporary parenting practices. Two conclusions and a host of
normative questions emerge.
First, it is the erosion of exclusive parenthood that poses the greatest threat to the totality
of attributes that we associate with biological parenthood. As Diagram 1 makes clear,
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recognizing functional, non-exclusive parenthood undermines all of the core qualities
associated with biological parenthood. Ironically, given how transformative the idea of
non-exclusive parenthood may be, it has not been particularly controversial.229 Few
people decry the recognition of grandparent and step-parent rights as corrosive of the
family, yet the expansion of parental rights clearly does undermine biological norms. In
contrast, contemporary family practices, like single parenting and test-tube babies, that
are often portrayed as severely undermining the modern family, pose relatively little
threat to much of what makes bionormativity attractive.
The relative lack of controversy surrounding non-exclusive parenthood could stem from
what, in retrospect, seems like a soemwhat obvious observation: as adults cease to live
monogamous and stable lives, conceptualizations of parenthood grow less binary and
more fluid. But, of course, biology is binary and fixed. The movement we see toward a
greater number of parents and degrees of parenthood may suggest that the traditional
marital presumption did not necessarily act as a proxy for biology so much as it acted as a
proxy for adult-child relationship. The married people in a child’s household were the
ones most likely to have an important, legally cognizable relationship with that child.
The less stable marriage is, the less able it is to serve as a proxy for either biology or
important relationship. Still, that leaves us with the question of whether we want
parenthood to be stable and exclusive.
The second conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that many roads lead
to a concept of parenthood that is more inclusive, but also more hierarchical. A regime
that makes room for different kinds of legal parents allows adults with different kinds of
investment – genetic, emotional, financial – to retain some legal rights without
commanding the kind of authority or responsibility that parents have traditionally
enjoyed. In many of these situations, there will be one primary and several ancillary
parents. Parenthood will not be viewed as an equal enterprise for the people in it. A
regime that accepts the idea that there can be different degrees of parenthood will have an
easier time relegating a non-custodial parent to second class parental status precisely
because there will be such thing as second class parental status.
This result is not inevitable, particularly if one is able to identify and endorse those
attributes of bionormativity that may be worth fighting for in their own right.
Maintaining allegiance to the notion that parenthood should be private makes it less
likely that the state will be supporting children and therefore less likely that the state will
be regulating parenthood and making parental rights more diffuse. Maintaining
allegiance to the notion that parenthood should be an exclusive status makes it all but
impossible for multiple parents to emerge. Accepting the legitimacy of single parenthood
decreases the prevalence of unequal parenthood and thus helps sustain a notion of equal
parenthood. Maintaining allegiance to biological or genetic connection because it is good
for children makes men and women’s parental contributions seem equal and precludes
those who do not contribute biologically from asserting parental status. .
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It seems clear that the time has come for the law to choose the relative weight it gives to
the qualities of parenthood that accompany a bionormative regime. A premium on
biology is not mandated by history, evolutionary theory, or morality, but a premium on
biology does bring with it attributes that may have real value, and different attributes
have different value for different constituencies. Contemporary living patterns demand
some sort of change, but any change will come with costs to some and maybe even costs
to all. The policy priorities in this area are not easy or obvious, but they should be
defined in recognition of the consequences that are likely to follow.
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